MobileActive's Blog

Posted by SaferMobile on May. 18, 2011
Posted by MelissaUlbricht on May. 17, 2011

Targeting women with mobile phones and mobile-based projects can bring great benefits and opportunities, as we outlined in Part 1 of our series on women and mobiles. But, there is a “darker side” to this world, which includes changes in gender relations and power dynamic, a potential increase in violence, substitution of money or a change in expenditures, invasion of privacy, and increased control by a male partner.

Changes in Gender Relations and Power Dynamics

When the traditional social dynamic of a household is patriarchal, introducing a mobile phone into the hands of the woman can challenge the existing gender structure. Trina DasGupta, mWomen Programme Director for the GSMA Development Fund, writes in an e-mail to MobileActive.org, “threats to the status quo have sometimes been viewed negatively by community leaders and we have seen examples of this gender discrimination manifesting itself when women gain greater access to empowering tools, such as the Internet or mobile phones.”  

Women themselves may not agree. The GRACE project study in Kenya, for example, finds that women do not perceive mobiles at tools for males. “Unlike our literature review that suggested that the mobile phone is culturally construed as a male tool, the women entrepreneurs did not perceive the phone as such. However, the study does indicate that usage of the phone is culturally construed, with an increase in responsibilities and empowerment for one or other profession socially construed as women’s work.”

A paper by Aramanzan Madanda looks at gender relations and ICT adoption in Uganda (the work will soon be published in book format) and finds that “existing gender structures have been dented and that patriarchy is stressed by adoption of the technologies especially mobile phones leading to transformation of gender relations to an extent.”  

Posted by SaferMobile on May. 16, 2011

Activists, rights defenders, and journalists use mobile devices for reporting, organizing, mobilizing, and documenting. We have written about many of these uses for years now, describing how mobile phones provide countless benefits to activists and rights defenders. Mobile tech is relatively low cost and allows for increased efficiencies and vast reach, for example. But, there is a darker side.

Mobile Phones present specific risks to rights defenders, journalists, and activists. We believe that is is critically important to know that mobile communication is inherently insecure and exposes rights defenders and those working in sensitive environment to risks that are not easy to detect or overcome. (We provide an overview of those risks in this Primer, for instance)

To address mobile safety and security for rights defenders, we are introducing SaferMobile, to help activists, human rights defenders, and journalists assess the mobile communications risks that they are facing, and then use appropriate mitigation techniques to increase their ability to organize, report, and work more safely.

What is SaferMobile? 

  • Online and offline educational and tactical resources (risk evaluation tools, case studies, how-to guides, security tool reviews); 
  • Trainings and curricula for use in various countries and with different constituencies; 
  • Specific mobile security software focused on the needs of rights defenders, activists, and journalists.

As will all that we do, we believe that there certain values and principles that are paramount in this work. For SaferMobile, we are following these principles:

  • We believe that skilled, trained, and knowledgeable activists, journalists, and rights defenders are key to democratic changes. We also believe that the smart and effective use of technology constitutes an integral piece of their skill set.
  • The better activists, journalists, and rights defender are able to work, the more safely they are able to organize and communicate, the more likely it is that their work is effective and heard. 
  • We are committed to accessible, useful, actionable, and technically accurate and secure content, materials, and software. 
  • We are also committed to describing technological vulnerabilities in terms that non-technical users can easily understand. 
  • We work with activists on the ground to ensure that the content we produce addresses real uses and risks. 
  • We also seek responsive connections between activists and security professionals so that both are more able to assess and respond to changing risks.  
  • Lastly, we are maintaining information that reflects current security risks and technological vulnerabilities and is vetted for security and technological accuracy by knowledgeable experts.

Roadmap and Process

The SaferMobile project is just beginning its second Phase. Phase 1 included needs assessment with users and peers – activists, rights defenders, journalists, technologists, security experts, and mobile developers. Through this research, we outlined plans for web content, training curriculum and tools (software) and are now creating these pieces in Phase 2 of the project (May-August 2011). 

Our approach is iterative and open – we work as a team to develop ideas and welcome review and comments from peers. We maintain a wiki for this initial phase that will act as a living lab for content and code as we develop both. 

Posted by MelissaUlbricht on May. 11, 2011

A village in India last year banned unmarried women from using mobile phones for fear they would arrange forbidden marriages. The village council suspected young men and women were secretly calling one another to arrange to elope. Meanwhile, unmarried men could use mobile phones under parental supervision.

As mobile penetration increases across the developing world, the entry of mobile phones in the hands of women causes reactions. In many cases, mobile phone ownership empowers women in myriad ways: economic gains, increased access to information, greater autonomy and social empowerment, and a greater sense of security and safety.

But, there is a darker side. Targeting women with mobile phones can cause changes in gender dynamics and family expenditures and may relate to increases in domestic violence, invasion of privacy, or control by a male partner.

Posted by MarkWeingarten on May. 10, 2011

Apple’s release of version 4.3.3 of its iOS operating system “..kills iPhone tracking”, according to a recent article. After nearly three weeks of public attention on this issue, this news will perhaps appease some iPhone fans but is not likely to end the debate over what users should know and control about their smartphones’ location tracking abilities. Like Apple, Google’s Android and Microsoft’s Windows Phone systems have also recently come under fire, though important differences exist in the way each company collects and uses location-based information.

We have reviewed recent articles and research on each of these mobile operating systems’ location tracking capabilities and will describe the various claims made and the research undertaken to test these claims.

Posted by AnneryanHeatwole on May. 07, 2011

This podcast originally appeared in an edited form on The World Food Programme's blog.

The collection and analysis of information from the field is a big part of ensuring that programs are working correctly. Recently, journalist Justin Smith interviewed George Mu'ammar of the World Food Programme's Vulnerability Assessment and Mapping Unit on how his department uses mobile technology to collect data. Listen to the podcast below:

Posted by AnneryanHeatwole on May. 03, 2011

The Grameen Foundation recently released an in-depth report on the state of MoTeCH, a multi-part project that uses mobile technology to send pre- and post-natal health information to Ghanaians and allows community health workers to collect and share health data. Launched in July 2010 in the Upper East Region of Ghana, the system rolled out the next phase of the pilot in April 2011 in the Awutu Senya distract in the Central Region of Ghana. The report, "Mobile Technology for Community Health in Ghana: What It Is and What Grameen Foundation Has Learned So Far," takes an honest look at the progress and challenges the organization has faced while implementing a long-term, large-scale mHealth project.

Mobile Midwife

Posted by AnneryanHeatwole on Apr. 29, 2011

In today's Mobile Minute, we look at CGAP's coverage on branchless banking and micro-insurance, report on Nielsen and mobile privacy concerns, look at how the New York Times investigates Google's mobile approach and how smartphones are collecting data about cell towers and Wi-Fi hot spots. Lastly, a meetup for those interested in mHealth and ICT4D.

  • Interested in how branchless banking and micro-insurance can work together? GCAP has a roundup of three different organizations (from Ghana, the Philippines, and Kenya) that have paired mobile banking and micro-insurance in order to reach the unbanked and uninsured.

Posted by MelissaUlbricht on Apr. 27, 2011

One of the largest parallel vote tabulation efforts is under way right now in Nigeria to observe and monitor gubernatorial elections. Project 2011 Swift Count is observing the national assembly, state assembly, and gubernatorial elections with 8000 trained election observers. The observers are also working across six high-priority states to complete parallel vote tabulations to verify the official results in six corresponding gubernatorial elections.

At around 9pm in Nigeria on election day, MobileActive.org spoke with Chris Doten, senior program officer on the ICT team for the National Democratic Institute (NDI). When we spoke with Doten, two-thirds of trained election observers had sent in via text message final vote counts, meaning the final tallying was complete at that particular polling place. A much higher percentage of observers have sent in summaries of total ballots cast.

Posted by SaferMobile on Apr. 25, 2011

NOTE: This article was updated with an addendum and additional data.

Inspired by Michael Benedict's original blog post on monitoring SMS delivery reliability in Tanzania and recent reports of SMS keyword blocking in Uganda, MobileActive.org set out to replicate Michael's work - and add to it. SMS is such a crucial part of many mobile projects and just day-to-day life across the developing world, yet there’s a lack of public knowledge of mobile network operator interdependency, latency, and reliability (how mobile network operators work together to transmit SMS, the lag time between sending and receiving a message, and the guarantee that a message will reach its recipient).

Michael's post got us thinking: Can this type of experiment be replicated without extra hardware required (GPRS modems, etc.)? After a few quick brainstorming sessions at the OpenMobile Lab in New York, we created an alpha version of a mobile application that recreates a number of latency tests. It’s far from perfect - and there is still plenty of work to be done - but we’re confident that this project will lead us to extremely valuable data about the transparency and reliability of SMS on mobile networks.

SMSTester - The App

SMSTester is a simple Android app that allows a user create a set of keywords to be sent as SMS messages. This allows the user to explore differences in latency for any type of message - from basic, everyday text like ‘milk’ or ‘newspaper’ to politically inflammatory text such as ‘revolution.’ We then set up a logging mechanism to timestamp and record each SMS as it is sent (from the sender side) or received (on the receipt side). By comparing the sent and received timestamps, we’re very easily able to calculate message latency from one SIM to another.

Initial Deployment

We deployed SMSTester in a test in Egypt a few weeks ago. As this was the initial trial for a fully untested application, we were careful.  While we did run our tests across a number of local mobile operator networks, we kept the test volume small enough to keep us under the radar (for now!). Our test methodology included:

  1. Testing across all three major mobile operator networks in Egypt: Etisalat, Mobinil, and Vodafone
  2. Consistent keyword test bed containing both ‘safe’ and ‘political’ terms, where ‘safe’ refers to everyday vocabulary and ‘political’ refers to politically sensitive words
  3. Language coverage across both English and Arabic
  4. Roughly 270 messages successfully sent, received and analyzed

What We Looked For And Why

The main focus of our analysis was SMS delivery latency, delay, or more generally, delivery failures. There are plenty of anecdotal stories of seemingly random delays lasting multiple hours or even days in many countries where we work. While network congestion and growing infrastructure are often to blame for SMS unreliability, there are also legitimate concern that delays may be an indication of deliberate message filtering and monitoring. What has emerged is an environment in which activists and human rights defenders are unable to clearly understand what networks - and what behavior - is safe or hazardous for themselves or their contacts. The end goal of this research, put simply, is to change this paradigm. Rumors of keyword filtering are not helpful; what is helpful is any evidence of surveillance.

This small experiment is just a start, of course. Our hypothesis is that keyword filtering and other malicious behavior on the part of mobile network operators may manifest in the form of increased message latency or overt message blockage. If we could detect any sign of a correlation between message content and delivery with just some initial testing in-country, this would be a great first step towards our overall goal. However it’s very important to note that while message latency or failure may be indicative of bad behavior on the part of the carries, it could be due to any number of contributing factors and is by no means an implication of foul play. For now we’re merely hypothesizing.

Results

Despite the minor bugs discovered, we gathered very valuable information about message latency in Egypt during this trial. The most valuable data was on the Etisalat network (also known as the Emirates Telecommunications Corporation), based in the UAE. The majority of the data we recovered from this trial was between an Etisalat SIM and other Egyptian networks. (Note: This was the result of inadvertent data loss for other test scenarios and we did not specifically target Etisalat).

Main Conclusions

Big Caveat (READ THIS!): Given the small sample size of this test, it should be noted that none of these conclusions are definitive. In fact, the very nature of such a small sample size warrants much further investigation.

(1) Delivery between Etisalat & Mobinil networks warrants further investigation. As shown below, the delivery time for English language text messages from Etisalat to Mobinil is significantly greater than delivery time to any other network, for both English and Arabic texts. This may be due to any number of network delays, and it may also be indicative of English language filtering by one or both of the mobile network operators.

 (2) Delivery time of politically sensitive English messages on Etisalat warrants further investigation. The chart below shows that politically sensitive English messages sent across the Etisalat network were delivered with significantly more latency than others, with the possible exception of politically sensitive Arabic messages. In addition, each of the three messages that were delivered out of order fell into this category. Similar to the above conclusion, this may be indicative of specific filtering on behalf of Etisalat.